INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Awards ("Motion") came on for hearing on November 8, 2024, at 10:30 a.m., in Courtroom 8A of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, with the Honorable Josephine L. Staton presiding.

Plaintiffs moved the Court for an award of \$10.5 million in attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and costs not to exceed \$1.7 million, and service awards in the amount of \$30,000 (\$15,000 to each Named Plaintiff).

Having considered the Plaintiffs' motion, the supporting Declarations and exhibits attached thereto, the relevant legal authority, the record in this case, and the argument of Counsel at the hearing thereon; the Court hereby FINDS, ORDERS, AND ADJUDGES as follows:¹

I. ATTORNEYS' FEES

As the underlying claims here are based on state law, the Court applies state law with respect to the fee request. *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under both California state law and Ninth Circuit precedent, where a settlement "produces a common fund for the benefit of the entire class, courts have discretion to employ either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery method." *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011); *Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc.*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 503-504 (2016).

Historically, lodestar has been the "primary method for establishing the amount of reasonable attorney fees" under California state law claims. *In re Vitamin Cases*, 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052 (2003) (cleaned up); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 (1977) ("*Serrano III*"). The lodestar method is particularly appropriate in case asserting statutory claims that authorize "fee-

¹ For purposes of this Order, the Court adopts and incorporates the terms and definitions set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement ("SS").

Application of the lodestar method is warranted here. Plaintiffs' CLRA claims are subject to a mandatory fee shifting provision, Cal. Civil Code §1780(e), enacted to "incentivize counsel" to protect consumers through "publicly beneficial litigation." *In re Cobra Sexual Energy Sales*, Case No. 2:13-cv-05942-AB-Ex, 2021 WL 4535790, *18 (C.D. Cal. April 7, 2021). The same is true for the Elder Financial Abuse claims. Cal. W&I Code § 15657.5; *Arace v. Medico Investments LLC*, 48 Cal.App.5th 977, 981-982 (2020) (attorneys' fees and other enhanced remedies in Elder Abuse Act intended to "encourage" statutory enforcement, citing *Negrete v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co.*, 444 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

Further, the settlement includes injunctive relief, including terms that are readily monetizable and other terms that are not. Specifically, the stipulated Injunction includes Staffing, Training and Monitoring ("STM") provisions that will result in quantifiable economic benefits to Class Members who currently reside in Sunrise facilities (as well as other non-Class residents. Dkt.631-18 (Suppl. Kennedy Decl.), ¶¶3,6. Other Injunction provisions (such as the Disclosure provisions) provide additional important (although not monetizable) benefits to the general public. Injunction, ¶¶1-4; Dkt. 614-9 (Kennedy 4/17/24 Decl.), ¶¶27-28.

Courts awarding attorneys' fees under the lodestar method are "encouraged" to cross-check the requested fees under the "percentage-of-recovery" analysis. *Lowery v. Rhapsody Int'l, Inc.*, 75 F.4th 985, 988 (9th Cir. 2023). The "recovery" under the percentage method includes both cash and the

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"value of nonmonetary relief. In determining an appropriate fee award, courts "must expressly consider the value that the settlement provided to the class, including the value of nonmonetary relief." Lowery, 75 F.4th at 992; In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 943-45.

Percentage considerations, including the 25% benchmark, do not cap the amount of fees that can be awarded, if justified under the circumstances of the case. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048. However, if a fee award proposed under the lodestar method exceeds 25% of the settlement recovery, courts take a "hard look" at the claimed lodestar to ensure the requested fee is reasonable. Lowery, 75 F.4th at 994.

Class Counsels' Lodestar A.

The lodestar calculation "begins with the multiplication of the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate." *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1029; Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc., 82 Cal. App. 4th 19, 26 (2000). With respect to the hours worked, courts consider whether "in light of the circumstances, the time could reasonably have been billed to a private client." Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008).

Generally, courts "defer to the winning lawyer's professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case." Chaudhry v. City of L.A., 751 F.3d 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, –U.S. –, 135 S.Ct. 295, 190 L.Ed.2d 141 (2014) (cleaned up); *Holt v. Kormann*, Case No. SACV 11-01047 DOC (MLGx), 2012 WL 5829864, *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (attorney's sworn testimony "is evidence of considerable weight" on the issue of the time required for particular task) (cleaned up).

Under California law, fee awards should generally be "fully compensatory." Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133 (2001). Thus, "absent circumstances rendering the award unjust, an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent." Id.; Serrano III, 20 Cal.3d at 49.

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An attorney's lodestar figure is "presumptively reasonable." *Cunningham v. Cnty. of Los Angeles*, 879 F.2d 481, 488 (9th Cir.1988); *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 941. However, submitted lodestar hours should reflect the exercise of "billing judgment" to address "any excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours." *Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs*, 285 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 2002).

Courts can adjust lodestar fees "upward or downward" to ensure a reasonable fee award, in consideration of factors such as the "quality of representation, the benefit obtained for the class, the complexity and novelty of the issues presented, and the risk of nonpayment." *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 941-942.

Here, Class Counsel have submitted Declarations² (and a Lodestar Summary spreadsheet) attesting to over 20,900 hours worked on this case which amount to total lodestar fees exceeding \$15 million. The submitted Declarations and Lodestar Summary detail the work performed and specific tasks undertaken in the successful prosecution of this case.

Class Counsel have discounted gross lodestar hours in specific areas (general potentially duplicate or unnecessary time), Class Counsel conference calls, unsuccessful motion to add a "subject to arbitration" class representative, and travel time. Dkt. 632-1, pp. 16-18. After these billing judgment reductions, the net lodestar fees exceed \$13.6 million. Dkt. 631-2 (Healey Decl.), ¶¶106-108; Dkt. 631-7 (Healey Decl., Ex. 4).

The Court finds net lodestar hours and fees submitted by Class Counsel are reasonable and appropriate, given the work performed and results achieved in the case.

B. Class Counsel's Hourly Rates

² Declarations have been submitted by Class Counsel Kathryn Stebner, Chris Healey, Guy Wallace, Michael Thamer, Megan Yarnall, David Mark and Stefanie Warren, appellate specialist, Monique Olivier. Dkts. 631-11 through 631-17.

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The second step is determining the reasonable market value of the attorneys' services at an hourly rate. Ketchum, 24 Ca1.4th at 1134; Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008).

Under the lodestar analysis, the hourly rates used in a fee request must be "reasonable" given the "experience, skill and reputation of the attorney requesting fees." Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). The requested rates must be "in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonable comparable skill, experience and reputation." Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980. Generally, the "forum district represents the relevant legal community." Sarabia v. Ricoh USA Inc, Case No. 8:20-cv-00218-JLS-KES, 2023 WL 3432160, *7 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2023).

Multiple courts (including this Court) have found the "annual Real Rate Report" to be a "useful guidepost" for assessing reasonable rates in the Central District. Sarabia, *8 (collecting cases). Here, the hourly rates charged by Class Counsel are within the Third Quartile rates in the current Real Rate Report (2023) Report). Compare Dkt. 631-7 (Healey Decl., Ex. 4 (Lodestar Spreadsheet, Summary Tab, listing hourly rates)) with Dkt. 631-8 (Healey Decl., Ex. 5 (2023 Real Rate Report), pp. 16, 25, 29-30).

The Third Quartile rates in the Real Rate Report are the appropriate guideline here. Class Counsel have literally decades of experience successfully prosecuting class actions involving understaffing claims asserted against assisted living and skilled nursing facilities. Dkt. 631-11 (Marks Decl.), ¶¶3-7; Dkt. 631-12 (Thamer Decl.), ¶¶2-3; Dkt. 631-13 (Stebner Decl.), ¶¶3-6; Dkt. 631-2 (Healey Decl.), ¶¶6-9. Multiple courts have approved hourly rates for many of Class Counsel, at levels commensurate with the rates requested here. Dkt. 631-2 (Healey Decl.), ¶136; Dkt. 631-10 (Healey Decl.), Ex. 7.

Further, given the delay in payment over this 7-year litigation, Class Counsel could have applied current hourly rates to prior time entries. Stetson v. Grissom, 821

F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (to compensate for delayed payment, lodestar should be calculated using "the prevailing rate as of the date of the fee request" or by "using historical rates and compensating for delays with a prime-rate enhancement"). Here, four firms (Marks, Trails Law Group, Thamer, Oliver) charged the same rate for all hours worked. Three firms (Dentons, Stebner, Janssen) increased rates during the litigation but did not retroactively apply the higher rates. Consistent with Stetson, Schneider Wallace applied higher rates to prior work, but capped rates at 2023 levels. Dkt. 631-2 (Healey Decl.), ¶132.

Accordingly, the Court finds the hourly rates requested by Class Counsel to be reasonable and in line with the market rates charged by skilled counsel in the Central District in similar complex civil litigation.

C. Benefits Provided To Settlement Class

The key consideration in any fee request is whether the "value provided to the class, including the value of nonmonetary relief" justifies the fee award. *Lowery*, 75 F.4th at 993; *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 943-45.

Here, the \$18.2 million cash payment represents at least 34% of the likely trial recovery and exceeds the cash payments obtained in comparable settlements. Dkt. 631-2 (Healey Decl.), ¶83, 91. Further, the Staffing Training Monitoring (STM) provisions in the Injunction result in avoided economic harm benefit of at least \$9.36 million for Settlement Class Members who reside in Sunrise facilities during the Injunction term. Dkt. 631-18 (Supp. Kennedy Decl.), ¶6. Dr. Kennedy's analysis is based on an "avoided economic harm" methodology, (Dkt. 614-9, ¶16-22), which has been approved by multiple courts. *Troy v. Aegis Senior Communities, LLC*, Case No. 16-cv-03991-JSW, 2021 WL 6129106, *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2021); *Walsh v. Kindred Healthcare*, Case No. C 11-00050 JSW, 2013 WL 6623190, **3-4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013); *see also, Heredia v. Sunrise Senior Living LLC*, Case No. 22-55332, 2023 WL 4930840, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023).

Combined, the cash and injunctive relief provides an overall value of at least \$27.56 million for the Settlement Class. The Injunction also results in other (non-monetized) benefits, such as the benefits to consumers from the Disclosure provisions. Dkt. 614-9. ¶¶27-29. Even if not easily monetized, the Disclosure provisions provide societal benefits properly considered in determining an appropriate fee award here. *In re Ferrero*, 583 Fed. Appx. at 668 ("meaningful" injunction that is "consistent with the relief" sought in the lawsuit supports approval of fee award); *Lowery*, 75 F.4th at 992, n.1.

D. Percentage-Of-Recovery Cross-Check

Plaintiffs' fee request of \$10.5 million represents roughly 38% of the overall \$27.56 million in economic value provided to the Settlement Class ((\$18.2 million cash plus \$9.36 million benefit from STM Injunction provisions). That falls within the range approved in other cases. *In re Ferrero*, 583 Fed.Appx. at 668 (approving fee award of \$985,920 where settlement benefits are \$550,000 cash plus (non-monetized) injunctive relief requiring changes to product labels and advertising); *Andrade-Heymsfield v. Nextfoods, Inc.*, Case No. 3:21-cv-01446-BTM-MSB, 2024 WL 3871634, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2024) ("some [percentage of recovery] awards go up to 50%"); *Cicero v. DirectTV, Inc.*, Case No. EDCV 07-1182; 2010 WL 2991486, at **6-7 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) (survey of class action "suggests that 50% is the upper limit, with 30-50% commonly awarded in cases in which the common fund is relatively small").

Under *Lowery*, if the requested fee "exceeds 25% of the benefit to the class," a "hard and probing look" is warranted to ensure the award is reasonable. *Lowery*, 75 F.4th at 994. Here, Class Counsel's lodestar hours are supported my detailed time entries and the "net" lodestar numbers reflect "billing judgment" adjustments. The hourly rates charged fall squarely within market (as confirmed by the Real Rate Report and other sources) and do not include a "delayed payment" adjustment. The requested fee (\$10.5 million) represents a discount of

\$3.1 million from Class Counsel's net lodestar fees. Additionally, the fee request is \$400,000 below the amount permitted under the Settlement Stipulation. Dkt. 631-3 (SS), ¶9.1.

Further, in considering whether an adjustment from the 25% benchmark is warranted, courts generally consider the results achieved, risk of litigation, skill required and quality of work, and litigation burdens and whether settlement produced non-cash benefits, such as injunctive relief. *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1048–50; *Sarabia*, 2023 WL 3432160, at *5. These considerations further reinforce the reasonableness of the instant lodestar fee request.

With respect to "results achieved," the key question is the value provided to the class in terms of cash and nonmonetary relief. *Lowery*, 75 F.4th at 993; *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 943-45. Here, the \$18.2 million cash exceeds the monetary benefits in comparable settlements. Dkt. 631-2 (Healey Decl.), ¶¶91-92. And the STM Injunction provisions alone provide an additional monetized benefit of \$6.36 million to Settlement Class Members. Dkt. 631-18 (Supp. Kennedy Decl.), ¶6.

With respect to the risk factor, the case presented multiple challenges. On the merits, Sunrise marshalled substantial evidence to support its customer satisfaction defense, including 248 declarations and multiple consumer satisfaction awards from independent sources, such as JD Power and U.S. News & World Report. *See* Dkts. 406-407, 402-9, Ex. 48. As to class certification, Plaintiffs believe their economic loss claims were suitable for class treatment, but not all jurists have agreed. *See* Dkt 566 (Rule 23(f) grant); *Stiner v. Brookdale Senior Living, Inc.*, 665 F.Supp.3d 1150, 1208-1210 (N.D. Cal. 2023).

The successful prosecution of this case required skillful lawyering, particularly given Sunrise's resources and choice of defense counsel. In addition to other high-quality counsel, Sunrise was represented by Gibson Dunn, one of the most prestigious and aggressive law firms in the county. *In re American*

Apparel, Inc. S'holder Litig., Case No. CV 10-06352 MMM (JCGx), 2014 WL 10212865, at *22 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2014) (court considers "quality of opposing counsel as a measure of the skill required to litigate the case successfully").

The case presented significant litigation burdens. Over seven years of litigation, Class Counsel worked over 20,900 hours on case investigation, discovery, motion practice, class certification, appellate proceedings and other tasks. Dkt. 631-2 (Healey Decl.), ¶106-111. The class certification and Daubert motions, in particular, required extensive analysis and presentation of merits proof. In addition, Class Counsel advanced over \$1.7 million in expert costs and other litigation expenses, including significant costs associated with MedModel's staffing shortfall analysis. *Id.* (Healey Decl.), ¶134; Dkt. 631-7 (Healey Decl.), Ex. 4 (Lodestar Spreadsheet). The protracted proceedings and substantial cost advancement support a higher percentage fee award. *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1050.

With respect to "non-cash" considerations, both Settlement Class Members and Non-Class residents will benefit from the Injunction provisions bolstering facility staffing, as they rely on the same pool of care providers. *See* Dkt. 614-8 (Flores 4/17/24 Decl.), ¶¶13-14. Further, the general consuming public will benefit from improved disclosures in Sunrise's admission contract with respect to how resident assessments impact facility staffing levels. Dkt. 631-4 (Injunction), ¶¶1-4. The "meaningful" injunctive relief resulting in a "considerable benefit to society" supports Plaintiffs' requested fee. *See Lowery*, 75 F.4th at 994-995; *In re Ferrero*, 583 Fed.Appx. at 668.

E. Additional Considerations

Imposing a 25% or other artificial cap on attorneys' fees here would undermine the Legislative intent under the CLRA and Elder Financial Abuse statutes to encourage meritorious lawsuits through the mandatory fee-shifting provisions. *In re Cobra Sexual Energy Sales*, 2021 WL 45355790, *18 (CLRA fee shifting designed to "incentivize counsel" to protect consumers through

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"publicly beneficial litigation); Delaney v. Baker, 20 Cal.4th 23, 33 (1999) (fee provision in elder abuse statute enacted to encourage "attorneys to take up the cause").

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for attorneys' fees in the amount of \$

II. REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

Class Counsel are entitled to reimbursement of reasonable out-of-pocket costs and expenses advanced in investigating, prosecuting, and settling this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h); Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994) (approving reimbursement reasonable expenses that would "normally be charged to a fee paying client"); Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 974 (9th Cir. 2003). The California Consumers Legal Remedies Act and the California financial elder abuse statute, provide for reimbursement of costs incurred. Cal. Civil Code §§ 1750 et seq., 1780(e); Cal. W&I Code § 15657.5.

Here, Class Counsel have capped the requested reimbursement for litigation costs and expenses at \$1.7 million. As supported by Class Counsel's declarations, these costs and expenses were reasonably necessary for the prosecution of the lawsuit. Upon review of Class Counsel's declarations and attached exhibits, the Court finds that the requested expenses are reasonable and should be reimbursed.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses and costs in the amount of \$

III. SERVICE AWARDS FOR NAMED PLAINTIFFS

The two Named Plaintiffs respectfully seek service awards of \$15,000 each (\$30,000 total). The requests are within the range permitted under the Settlement Stipulation. Dkt. 631-3 (SS), ¶9.3.

The requested awards are warranted, given the "strong commitment" to the class shown here by the named Plaintiffs. Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CV 08 1365 CW (EMC), 2010 WL 1687832, **18 & n.8 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

1	22, 2010) (approving \$20,000 service award; collecting cases). Specifically, both
2	Plaintiffs devoted considerable time and effort throughout their extended service
3	(close to five years) in this litigation. They participated in numerous conferences
4	with Class Counsel on case status, deposition preparation, and settlement related
5	matters. Both were subjected to intense full-day depositions, which forced the
6	witnesses to revisit painful and difficult experiences by beloved family members.
7	And perhaps most telling, both turned down substantial individual settlement
8	offers. Dkt. 614-7 (Ganz 4/17/24 Decl.), ¶¶36-37,40; Dkt. 614-6 (Fearn 4/17/24
9	Decl.), ¶¶31-32, 34.
10	The requested amounts are within the range approved by other courts within
11	the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Chen v. Western Digital Corp., Case No. 8:19-cv-
12	00909-JLS-DFM, 2021 WL 9720778, *18 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2021) (granting
13	\$18,000 service award); Singer v. Becton Dickinson & Co., Case No. 08-CV-821-
14	IEG (BLM), 2009 WL 4809646, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2009) (approving \$25,000
15	service award); Garner, 2010 WL 1687832, at *17 (approving \$20,000 service
16	award).
17	Accordingly, the Court GRANTS service awards in the amount of \$ to
18	both Named Plaintiffs (for a total of \$).
19	IT IS SO ORDERED.
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21	Dated:
22	Hon. Josephine L. Staton
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